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The objective of this paper is to assess the differences between contagion and investors’ risk aversion in 
terms of their impact on European sovereign bond yields during the financial crisis. This paper evaluates 
contagion at banking level, as it has the advantage of capturing the exposure of sovereign debt markets 
to financial sector’s risk and also the contagion between sovereign spreads that occurs through the 
financial sector channel. The paper analyzes the period from 2008 to 2012 and also the Greek, Portuguese 
and Spanish bailout periods. The results indicate that the main driver of yields in Europe is risk aversion 
and not contagion. The main differences between Central and Southern European countries’ yields are 
explained by risk aversion. This channel has a much stronger impact on the periphery. On the other hand, 








The main objective of this paper is to assess the differences between contagion and investors’ 
risk aversion in terms of their impact on European sovereign bond yields during the financial crisis. 
In the literature both variables are often confused, with risk aversion perceived as contagion and the 
other way around. In this paper the difference between contagion and risk aversion will be clarified, 
with the conclusion that the different behaviors of sovereign yields between Southern and Central 
European countries during the current crisis were caused mainly by investors’ risk aversion and not 
contagion. 
This study will also evaluate the contagion and risk aversion during the two Greek bailouts as 
well as the debt restructure and the Spanish and Portuguese bailouts. That will help to understand if 
the increase in Southern European countries’ yields during these events was triggered by contagion 
or risk aversion. Once again, it will be possible to conclude that the difference between the core and 
European peripheral countries occurs due to risk aversion and not contagion, as the contagion affects 
all countries in the same way. 
The paper will evaluate contagion from banks to countries. As discussed in the literature, the 
banking sector risk is connected to the country’s risk. Nonetheless, there is no quantification of the 
contagion of banking risk in one country to another country’s risk. With the methodology used in 
this paper it will be possible to quantify the contagion from a bank in country A to a bank in country 
B and then display how it affects country’s B sovereign bond yields. 
Since the introduction of the Euro two different phenomena regarding the behavior of the 
sovereign interest rates of the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries could be observed. From 
1999 until the start of the financial crisis in 2008, the sovereign bond interest rates converged, with 
spreads very close to zero. After 2008, there has been a divergence between Southern and Central 
Euro Area sovereign bond yields, with Germany often mentioned as a "safe heaven". 
In 1999 there were significant differences in interest rates between peripheral countries (like 
Portugal, Greece or Italy) and core countries (France or Germany) with country specific factors, 
such as economic growth, budget deficits, level of debt, playing an important role. However, with 
the introduction of the Euro, country specific risks started to lose their significance within the EMU 
countries, and interest rate differentials almost disappeared. Pozzi and Wolswijk (2008) studied the 
period between 1995 and 2006 and concluded that by 2006, in the EMU, country specific factors 
did not play an important role. 
Bernoth and Erdogan (2010) pointed out that with the formation of the EMU some factors, such 
as debt and deficits of the issuing country, did not have as much impact on sovereign spreads when 
compared with the period before the establishing of the EMU. Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht 
(2006) also show that with the establishment of the EMU there was a change of focus on the 
fundamental macroeconomic variables of each country, from debt and deficits to debt service ratio. 
Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) highlighted some differences on the determinants of yield 
spreads before and after the EMU. Before the EMU, expected exchange rate movements, tax 
treatments, control on capital movements, liquidity and credit risk were the main factors affecting 
yield spreads within future EMU countries. However, in 1999, in spite of the introduction of the 
Euro, exchange rate related risks vanished in EMU countries. Also, control of the capital movements 
and different tax treatments were harmonized before the EMU. Consequently, the two factors that 




Buiter and Grafe (2003) also shared this point of view, arguing that they found the convergence 
of the interest rates a surprising fact considering that the adoption of a single currency does not 
eliminate sovereign default risk differentials. They proved that even though interest rates (both long 
and short term) were converging, the short term real interest rates were not converging. 
Although the sovereign interest rates were converging, there were still minor differences 
between the EMU countries. Pagano (2004) pointed out that liquidity, default risk and vulnerability 
to the risk of an eventual EMU collapse were the cause of the minor spread differentials in the 
beginning of the EMU. In addition to those factors, Heppke-Falk and Hufner (2004) mention the 
expectations built about the future country's deficit. Nevertheless there is some discrepancy in the 
impact of the expected deficits. While Canzoreni et al. (2002) proved that expected deficits would 
affect both long and short term sovereign interest rates, Laubach (2003,2004) and Gale and Orszag 
(2004) proved only a relation with long term interest rates. Ardagna, Carelli and Lane (2004) also 
demonstrated that deficits affected long term interest rates and that there was a non-linear relation 
between the level of government debt and sovereign bond yields: only when the debt ratio is above 
a certain threshold, does it affect sovereign yields. 
Baek, Bandopadhyaya and Du (2005) argued that the market premium of country risk is affected 
by liquidity, solvency, economic stability and investor's attitude towards risk. Nonetheless the 
market premium could be affected in different ways depending if it is on long or short term 
maturities. According to Eichler and Maltritz (2012) indicators such as the growth rate of debt and 
trade balance affected more long term maturities whereas GDP growth rate and openness (proxied 
by exports plus imports) impacted all the maturities. 
Meanwhile, with the eruption of the financial crisis in 2008, EMU sovereign bond yields started 
to diverge and investors became more risk averse and focused more on country specific 
fundamentals, like debt and deficit levels. Dötz and Fischer (2010) claim that the turning point from 
a non-crisis period to a crisis period was the bailout of Bear Stearns in 2008. They estimate a pre- 
crisis and a crisis specification to find out two major differences. On the pre-crisis period spreads 
for corporate bonds and the real exchange rate had a negative impact on sovereign bond yield 
spreads, whereas on the crisis periods both variables had a positive and statistically significant 
impact. 
After 2008, the differentials were caused mainly by an overall increase in risk aversion, contagion 
and an increase in the price of risk (Bernoth and Erdogan, 2010). Investors behavior during crisis 
periods had been previously studied by Dungey et al (2000), Copeland and Jones (2001) and 
Lemmen (1999), all agreeing that during a crisis period there was a tendency among investors to 
move to safer and more liquid assets, further widening the spreads. Moreover, the findings of Sgherri 
and Zoli (2009) are in line with that perception, given that their finding that after the beginning of 
the financial crisis, the liquidity of markets had a major impact on sovereign bonds, explained by 
the "flight to safety" by investors. Gomez-Puiz (2006) and Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) also 
argued that differentials in spreads were explained by liquidity. According to Mody (2009), investors 
paid more attention to the weaknesses of financial markets and determinants of country's specific 
risk. 
Equally, Abmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2009) show that there were major differences on how 
sovereign spreads were affected between 2003 and 2007 and after 2007. Between 2003 and 2007 
debt to GDP ratio was the most important ratio for investors. That was not the case after 2007 when 
budget balances and liquidity started to play a much more important role. Since liquidity started to 
have a bigger impact on sovereign bond yield spreads, banking risk also affected the spreads through 
three main factors: shortage in banking liquidity, government recapitalization of banks, and bank 
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bailouts. Ejsing and Lemke (2010) also found a positive correlation between sovereign and banks 
CDS premia, strengthening the idea that banking risk had an impact on country risk. 
Contagion also ignited the divergences between Euro countries’ sovereign bond yields. 
Arghyrov and Kontonikas (2012) provided a specification to evaluate how contagion affected 
spreads. They divided the EMU countries into two groups: the core and the periphery. They saw 
how each country was affected by the average of spreads of EU countries and how periphery 
countries and core countries affected the spreads. That enabled them to conclude that there was intra 
periphery contagion, i.e. between countries of the periphery group, and periphery to core contagion, 
with Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain being the main drivers of contagion. 
Even though that literature significantly expands the knowledge on the determinants of sovereign 
bond yield spreads, there are still some gaps regarding the evaluation of the impact of contagion and 
investors’ risk aversion as well as the study of how certain events taking place in a given country 
spread out to other countries. This is where this paper will contribute to the literature, by estimating 
the impact of banking contagions and differentiating it from risk aversion, both during the crisis 
period and the bailout events in the given countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model and the variables of interest are 
presented. In sections 3 and 4 the results of the model during the entire period considered and during 
the sovereign bailouts are displayed, while in Section 5 the overall results of the study are discussed. 
Section 6 present some robustness tests and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Instruments estimation 
A change in sovereign interest rates is usually associated with changes in country’s specific 
fundamentals such as debt to GDP ratio, GDP growth rate, government deficits. However the 
phenomenon of sovereign interest rates fluctuations may also be due explained by other reasons. 
This paper will focus on the effects of contagion and changes in risk averseness among investors. 
At times, countries that were not experiencing any macroeconomic changes have watched their 
sovereign bond yield spreads changing. This may occur as a result of contagion. As the current 
Eurozone countries have strong economic links, with free capital movements between countries, a 
common currency, among other reasons, a change in one country’s specific fundamentals will affect 
not only the sovereign bond yields of this particular country but also the yields for other countries. 
Furthermore, the sovereign interest rates may change due to risk aversion of investors. The price 
of an asset is usually modeled on its returns and on the risk premium required by investors to buy 
that asset. As investors become more risk averse they will demand higher risk premiums, which 
leads to an increase in sovereign spreads. 
To capture these two effects, this paper will use an approach adopted by Caceres, Guzzo and 
Segoviano (2010). Two variables, the Spillover Coefficient (SC) and the Index of Risk Aversion 
(IRA), will be constructed. The first variable will allow us to quantify the impact of banking 
contagion, by measuring the probability of default of a bank in a country i conditional on the fact 
that the bank in a country j defaults, while the second one will capture the investors’ risk aversion 





Spillover Coefficient (SC)  
To estimate the Spillover Coefficient a bank’s default probability will be extracted from CDS 
data. It will be then used to calculate how it may impact another bank’s default probability. This 
way it is possible to quantify how changes on one bank’s risk affects another bank’s distress 
probability. 
The SC variable will be calculated as the probability of bank in country i defaulting given that a 
bank in country j defaults, weighted by the probability of the bank in country j defaulting. SC is then 
given by 
𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃(𝐴𝑖𝑡|𝐴𝑗𝑡) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴𝑗𝑡)  ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
where 𝑃(𝐴𝑗) is the probability of default of a bank in country j
1, 𝑃(𝐴𝑖|𝐴𝑗) is the probability of 
distress of bank in country i given that bank in country j defaults. To calculate the conditional 
probability of default 𝑃(𝐴𝑖𝑡|𝐴𝑗𝑡), the CIMDO method (Segoviano, 2006) will be used, thanks to 
which it will be possible to find the joint probability of default, 𝑃(𝐴𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑗𝑡), given that the joint 
probability will be necessary to find the conditional probability using Bayes’ Law 




The CIMDO method consists in extracting from the data information on the unknown density 
probabilities (posterior distribution p(x,y) ). As the probabilities are extracted only from data of our 
interest there will be no need to recalibrate the probabilities since they will be consistent with the 
empirical data. 
By creating a prior distribution (q(x,y)) in accordance with economic intuition and theoretical 
models we are able to model a problem to minimize the differences between the prior and the 
posterior distribution. By constructing an objective function of the form 
𝐶[𝑝, 𝑞] = ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑙𝑛 [
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑞(𝑥, 𝑦)
] 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 
with a set of constraints given by 
∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑥,∞)𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 = 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑥 
    ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑦
,∞)𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑦
 
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 0 
∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 = 1 
where 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑖 is the probability of default of bank i at time t. This way it is possible to achieve the 
posterior distribution that is closest to the prior distribution but still consistent with empirical 
                                                          




observations. At a next stage the joint probability of default, C[p,q], is obtained by replacing the 
prior and posterior distributions on the objective function. 2  
Index of Risk Aversion (IRA) 
The IRA is an index that reflects the market perception of risk in each period, which in turn leads 
to changes in investors’ risk aversion. It quantifies the perception of risk among investors as it 
incorporates the volatility of the market and the distress probability perceived by investors. With 
this the price of risk asked by investors is calculated. The higher the price of risk the higher the 
investors’ risk aversion with respect to that asset. 
The IRA is given by 




where 𝑃𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑡 stands for Price of Risk, 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is the actual probability of default and 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is the price of 
security i. The volatility of 𝑚𝑖𝑡 will be equal to the market price of risk, which will be extracted 
from the Volatility Index VIX (measures the implied volatility of the S&P500) as proposed by 
Espinoza and Segoviano (2011). The actual probability of default will be estimated following a 












with 𝑆𝑁 being the CDS spreads of country N and K the recovery rate, which we will assume equal 
to 60%. To estimate the market price of risk in a stress situation we will define distress as the price 
of risk above a certain threshold value, and assuming mt+1 is normally distributed it is possible to 
use the truncated normal distribution formula so that  
𝐸𝑡(𝑚𝑡+1|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) =  𝐸𝑡(𝑚𝑡+1|𝑚𝑡+1 > 𝑇) = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡𝜆(α𝑡) 
with  
𝜇𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑚𝑡+1] 









where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function and 𝜑 is the normal density function. The 
threshold will be given by 
                                                          
2 See Annex I for detailed information of the CIMDO methodology. 
3 See Annex II for calibration of the actual probability of default 
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𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑚] + Φ−1[1 − 𝜋𝑡]√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑚) =
1
1 + ?̅?
+ Φ−1[1 − 𝜋𝑡]𝜎 
so the actual probability of default will be given by the non-linear equation 
𝜋𝑡 =
𝜋?̂?


















With the two variables that account for contagions and risk aversion calculated, the baseline 
specification can now be estimated. Daily observations from 31st of May 2008 to 31st of  December 
2014 for all initial Eurozone countries except Luxembourg, Finland, Ireland and Netherlands due to 
the lack of CDS spreads data, will serve as the database for this very study. All the financial data is 
the last updated price data provided by Bloomberg while the country’s specific data comes from 
Eurostat. 
From each country the bank that owns more debt of that country was selected to guarantee the 
connection between that bank and the sovereign yields. Nevertheless due to the lack of data of CDS 
spreads for some countries it was impossible to select in each case the bank that holds more national 
debt. The banks selected were Millennium BCP for Portugal, BBVA for Spain, Deutsche Bank for 
Germany, Intesa Sanpaolo for Italy, BNP Paribas for France, Erste Group Bank for Austria, KBC 
Bank for Belgium and Alpha Bank AE for Greece. 
With the objective of measuring the impact of contagion and risk aversion on the sovereign 
yields, the following T-GARCH model will be used 
Mean equation 






+ 𝛽4(𝐼𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑆𝐶𝑗𝑡𝑗≠𝑖,𝑘 + 𝑖𝑡   
Variance Equation 
𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝜃 𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼 𝑖𝑡−1
2 𝐼( 𝑖𝑡−1 < 0) 
where i stands for the country in study, j all the other countries in the sample and t the period. The 
dependent variable is the 5-year sovereign bond yield. A lag of the dependent variable is also 
included as an independent variable to control the high persistency of bond yields. Public debt and 
budget deficit as percentage of GDP are also incorporated in the specification as control variables 
for country fundamentals. The two main variables of interest are the German IRA and SC variables.  
Only the German IRA was included, as it works as a good proxy for investors’ risk aversion with 
respect to Eurozone countries. This way it is easier to draw comparisons between the results in 
different countries. The SC variable will allow us to measure the impact of contagion between banks 
on the sovereign yields, and will serve as the contagion from foreign banks to the sovereign. 
𝑡    is the error term with conditional variance given by a lag of the square of the error term itself 
(ARCH term), the conditional variance of the previous period (GARCH term) and also by a lag of 
the error term multiplied by an indicator function that will be equal to one if the error term is below 




The T-GARCH model was chosen to correct the heteroscedasticity present in the OLS equation. 
The addition of the TARCH term will account for the fact that variance may be asymmetrically 
dependent on the residuals. 
3. Risk aversion vs banking contagion: Impact on sovereign yields 
Contagion and investors risk aversion are often perceived as the same phenomenon. Some 
studies use both perceptions together to state that contagion is caused by an increase in investors’ 
risk aversion or the other way around. The results of this paper will distinguish the two phenomena 
and demonstrate that investors risk aversion plays more important role than pure contagion. 
Baek, Bandophadyaya and Chan Du (2005) constructed a quantifiable measure of market's 
attitude towards risk that allows us to understand how countries that do not experience changes in 
economic indicators have spreads changing, to conclude that contagion was the main factor. 
Another perspective of contagion is presented by Giordano, Pericoli and Tommasino (2013). 
Instead of just looking at contagion and its sources, they took a different approach defining three 
distinct processes of contagion. The first was “Wake-up call contagion” which occurs when a crisis 
taking place in a country makes investors more risk averse with respect to a country that was 
economically similar to the country dealing with the crisis. 
The second type was “Shift contagion”. This process was characterized by contagion occurring 
due to the intensification of the normal market channels and higher focus on factors common to 
different countries. The final definition was “Pure contagion” regarded as contagion coming from 
investors’ rationality, loss of confidence or capital losses in the country where the crisis originated. 
Here the focus will be on contagion having its source in foreign banks and the isolation of this 
effect so that it is not confused with investors’ price of risk demanded. Morison and White (2013) 
demonstrated that contagion between banks within the Euro Area takes place as banks are exposed 
to the same regulations. They found that the common regulations and not the correlation of the assets 
or interbank lending served as the main cause of contagion. This can be explained in the following 
way: if one bank fails it will lead to the loss of public confidence in the regulations and hence in 
banks subject to the same regulations. 
Abmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2009) and Ejsing and Lemke (2011) emphasized the connection 
between banking risk and sovereign yields, proving that after the beginning of the financial crisis 
liquidity and consequently the banking sector, started playing a huge role in the definition of 
sovereign yields. Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2013) also demonstrated the link between the 
bank and sovereign risk, arguing that financial sector bailouts contributed to the outbreak of the 
crisis and the increase of sovereign risk. 
Stânga (2014) also found a connection between banking bailouts and sovereign risk in European 
countries. 
Using this knowledge about contagion between banks and the linkage with sovereign risk, we 
are comfortable with our approach when calculating the SC variable and with its connection to 
sovereign yields. 
Results 
The results of estimating equation (1) using a T-GARCH are presented in table 1 (annex III). 
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Looking at the results it is possible to observe a different impact (of contagion and investors’ 
risk aversion) on Southern and Central European countries’ yields. The main difference consists in 
the IRA variable since an increase in investors’ risk aversion has a positive and significant impact 
on Portugal, Italy and Greece’s yields while in case of the Central European countries’ yields that 
factor does not play such a vital role and is not even statistically significant. It is also worth noting 
that country’s specifics, like debt and government deficits, do not exert as crucial influence on yields 
as contagion and investors’ risk aversion. 
The results of the contagion variable indicate that contamination between Southern European 
banks has, in general, a significantly negative or non-significant impact, except for Italian banks that 
are the only source of contagion making yields increase. This may suggest that investors looked at 
Portugal, Greece and Spain as investment substitutes, which means that if the risk of the financial 
sector in one country increases, investors will look for a substitute investment. This will in turn result 
in an increase in bonds’ prices of this substitute investment, and consequently decreasing yields. 
Contagion from Southern to Central Europe is in general non-significant. Nonetheless in some 
cases it is significantly positive. This suggests that an increase in the financial sector’s risk in the 
Southern European countries has a more negative impact on Central European countries’ yields than 
on the yields of other periphery countries. 
The contagion between Central European countries is in general either significantly positive or 
non-significant, demonstrating that investors perceive those countries as complement investments. 
The German case is the only one where contagion always decreases yields, proving its “safe-heaven” 
status. 
The main source of yields’ variation, in terms of contagion impact, is the contagion from Central 
to Southern Europe. If the financial sectors’ risk in Central European countries increases periphery 
countries’ yields will rise and the majority of the coefficients will be significantly positive. 
The results of the study, in particular the results of the contagion variable, contradict some 
findings in the literature. Arghyrov and Kontonikas (2012) found that contagion in intra periphery 
countries was the main reason for the divergence between peripheral and core countries in Europe, 
while Giordano, Pericoli and Tommasino (2013) concluded that contagion was caused by investors 
starting to pay more attention to specific country’s factors that contributed to the outbreak of the 
Greek crisis, and so the effects were stronger on periphery countries. 
This paper’s results, on the contrary, suggest that the main source of yields divergence is risk 
aversion and not contagion. However the findings also indicate that even contagion between Central 
and Southern European countries is stronger than contagion between Southern countries, which is 
not a source of divergence, as Arghyrov and Kontonikas (2012) and Giordano, Pericoli and 
Tommasino (2013) claimed. This may be justified with the approach adopted in this paper, which 
allows us to differentiate between pure contagion and investors’ risk aversion. 
What supports the statement that the differences between the results comes from the separation 
between contagion and risk aversion is also the impact of the IRA variable. It has been demonstrated 
that the risk aversion has a stronger and more significant impact on Southern European countries 
than on the Central ones, which is in line with the contagion results presented in other papers. It may 
indicate that contagion and risk aversion were being confused with one another. 
Other reason why the results may differ from the ones of the studies presented above is that in 
this paper the contagion between banks, and not sovereigns, is being analyzed. Nevertheless, Stânga 
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(2014) establishes the link between sovereign and banking risk, demonstrating that the increase of a 
bank’s risk or a banking bailout will also contribute to the augmentation of the sovereign’s risk. 
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2013) illustrated as well that banking and sovereign’s risk 
followed a similar path, which may indicate that the effect of sovereign and banking contagion on 
sovereign yields may not be that different. 
With this in mind, the SC variable may capture a channel of contagion between sovereigns, the 
financial sector one. The increase of a bank’s risk in country i will contribute to the higher risk of 
the sovereign in this country. As the sovereign’s risk in country i increases, bank’s risk in country B 
may increase as well. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) demonstrated that banks, trying to diminish their 
exposure to an individual country’s sovereign, diversify their portfolios. As a result, if sovereign’s 
risk in country i increases, the bank in country j is likely to be exposed to it and its risk will rise as 
well, which consequently affects the sovereign’s risk in country j. It is therefore possible to conclude 
that the difference between results presented in this study and the ones provided in other studies 
derives from the differentiation between contagion and investors’ risk aversion, and not the fact that 
this paper measures banking contagion instead of sovereign contagion. 
The advantage of measuring banking and not sovereign contagion is that it may help prevent 
endogeneity problems (analyzed in section 6). 
 
4. Impact of banking contagion and risk aversion during sovereign bailouts  
Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2013) studied the impact of sovereign bailouts on domestic   banks. 
They found that government bailouts are costly as they destroy domestic banks’ balance sheets. 
The aim of this section is to evaluate if the impact of sovereign bailouts on domestic banks is 
transmitted to foreign banks and if this transmission mechanism has an impact on foreign 
government yields. The bailout events to be analyzed are the following: the two Greek bailouts as 
well as the debt restructure, the Portuguese and the Spanish banks bailouts. 
With the methodology used it will be possible to distinguish if it was the risk aversion or the 
banking contagion that caused the yields divergence between Central and Southern European 
countries during these events. The results will strengthen even more the conclusions drawn in the 
previous section as they indicate that this divergence is mainly caused by investors’ risk aversion 
and not contagion. 
There is some literature studying how specific events occurring in one country spread to other 
countries. Over the years following the establishment of the Euro Area some warnings were issued 
for   some countries that were not respecting the rules of the Maastricht treaty. However, Codogno, 
Favero and Missale (2003) found that although the Portuguese spreads reacted to a warning issued 
in 2002, no other country responded to this or other warnings. 
Similarly Giordano, Pericoli and Tommasino (2013) studied three political decisions adopted by 
the EU. The first was the introduction of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The 
second was the introduction of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the last one was the 
decision to provide Greece with a new financial assistance program. They found that while the first 
decision eased the tensions in Europe the second had the opposite effect, which may have been 
caused by the Greek and Irish bailout. 
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Cobert (2014) evaluated the impact of sovereign rating downgrades on government debt to find 
out that the downgrade of the rating of a sovereign contributed to the yields’ increase throughout 
European countries. 
Mink and de Haan (2012) studied the impact of the Greek news on government and bank bonds. 
They were evaluating the news for twenty days with extreme returns on Greek bonds, to find out 
that only the Greek bailouts had an impact on sovereign and bank bonds, even on banks that have 
no exposure to Greece. 
Methodology 
The methodology used at this stage will be the same as the one applied in the model in section 3 
since the objective is still to differentiate between the impact of contagion and investors’ risk 
aversion, and the problems with the data are still the same. As the aim is to observe the contagion 
coming from countries where the bailouts took place, the impact on the government bonds of the 
country where the event occurs will not be evaluated. 
To catch the contagion during these events the following two dummy variables will be 
introduced: one equal to one on the day of the event and the following four week days, and other 
equal to one on the five week days before the event to control for expectations. These two dummies 
are then multiplied by the contagion variable of the country where the event takes place to isolate 
the impact of this variable during this period of time. 
The regression will be estimated during a period starting 30 week days before the event and 
ending 30 week days after, as usually done on the event literature. The regression will take the 
following form 
Mean equation 






+ 𝛽4(𝐼𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑆𝐶𝑗𝑡𝑗,𝑘 +
𝛽11(𝑆𝐶ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽11(𝑆𝐶ℎ𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ) + 𝑖𝑡 𝑗 ≠ ℎ ≠ 𝑖      (2) 
Variance Equation 
𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡|Ω𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝜃 𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼 𝑖𝑡−1
2 𝐼( 𝑖𝑡−1 < 0) 
where h stands for the country where the event takes place, i the country in study and j all the other 
countries in the sample, and t the period. 
The variables of interest will be the IRA and the dummies multiplied by the SC variable of the 
country where the event takes place. All the other variables are incorporated as control variables. 
Results 
The results of equation (2) are presented in Table II (annex III). The overall results of the event 
study support the conclusions of Section 3 that the investors’ risk aversion, and not contagion, is the 
main source of divergence. 
Usually, during these events Southern European countries’ yields rise more than these of the 
Central European countries. Mink and de Haan (2012) concluded that the Greek bailouts and the 




Those conclusions are in line with the results for the Greek bailouts and debt restructure 
presented in this paper which determine that  the Greek bailouts and the Greek news exerted much 
stronger influence on Portugal, Italy and Spain than on Austria, Belgium, France and Germany. The 
advantage of the methodology used in this paper is that it allows us to understand why these 
differences arise. 
The results indicate that the main differences come about due to a stronger impact of investors’ 
risk aversion on the periphery countries than on the core countries. Contagion has a similar impact 
throughout all European countries in sample making yields increase, which is in line with the 
findings of Mink and Haan (2012) who stated that even banks with no exposure to Greece were 
affected by the bailouts. In contrast, risk aversion affects almost exclusively Portugal, Spain and 
Italy. Comparing those results with the impact of risk aversion measured in Section 3, it is possible 
to conclude that the price of risk demanded by investors has an even stronger impact during these 
events than during the overall period. 
Portuguese and Spanish bailouts illustrate that difference even more explicitly. The results 
indicate that whereas contagion resulted in the increase of yields in the Central European countries, 
it made yields decrease in the other Southern European countries. This may show that Central 
European banks were more exposed to the Portuguese and Spanish situation. However, the impact 
of risk aversion, which is stronger than the impact of contagion, causes an increase of the Southern 
European countries’ yields. 
The impact of risk aversion on Austria, Belgium and France governments’ yields is even 
negative in some cases, which demonstrates the fact that investors move from periphery to these 
countries during these events. The IRA for Germany illustrates this move even more explicitly, and 
confirms the “safe-haven” status of Germany, as it has always a negative impact on the German 
yields. 
Consequently, the results of the event study allows to see more clearly the difference between 
contagion and risk aversion and presents even more evidence that investors risk aversion is the main 
cause of divergence between Southern and Central European countries’ yields. 
5. Discussion 
The conclusions drawn from the results of the overall period analysis indicate that risk aversion 
has a stronger impact on yields than both contagion and the country’s specifics included in the 
regression. The results of the event study strengthen this conclusion and show that during these 
events investors’ risk aversion influences yields to even a greater degree. 
Our methodology also allowed us to differentiate between contagion and investors risk aversion, 
two variables that are many times confused with one another in the literature. The results indicate 
that risk aversion was the main cause of divergence between Central and Southern European 
countries. Banking contagion has a similar impact throughout all European countries, which may 
indicate that banks in different countries are exposed to foreign countries/banks to the same degree. 
What would be interesting to understand is why investors’ risk aversion had a much stronger and 
more significant impact on Southern European country yields. The fact that the country’s specific 
variables have a diminished impact on yields, according to the results presented in this paper, may 
ensue from the introduction of investors’ risk aversion. Thus, as specifics were worse in case of the 
Southern countries, investors’ risk aversion had a greater impact on those countries’ yields. 
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In the literature it is shown that with the formation of monetary union country specifics lost their 
importance. Pozzi and Wolswijk (2008) studied the period between 1995 and 2006 to find out that 
with the introduction of the Euro country specific factors such as debt to GDP ratio or deficits, started 
to lose their significance when evaluating the determinants of sovereign interest rates. In 2006, in 
the EMU, country specific factors also did not play an important role, a position supported by 
Bernoth and Erdogan (2010). Nonetheless we could observe that with the outbreak of the financial 
crisis the country specific factors regained importance, evidence presented by Mody (2009). 
The introduction of risk aversion in our specification may have contributed to the smaller impact 
of specifics on yields. Some of the impact of those variables may be explained by the investors’ 
behavior. As specifics become negative, less investors want to invest in the country. 
Ang and Bekaert (1998) demonstrated that sovereign yields have two different regimes, and that 
those regimes are associated with GDP growth rates regime. The behavior of yields during the 
expansion is different from the behavior during the recession. 
Those two different regimes may be associated with investors’ risk aversion. In one regime, as 
macro specific variables of one country present worth results, investors become more risk averse  
with respect to that country, while in the other regime investors’ do not pay much attention to  
country specific factors and attach more importance to global factors. 
As the literature shows, with the establishment of the European Monetary Union country 
specifics lost their importance and there were minor spreads differential between European 
countries. Consequently, during “regular” times, country specific do not play an important role and 
there wouldn’t be therefore major differences between country spreads caused by investors’ risk 
aversion. That period of time may represent one regime. With the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
countries’ specifics regained importance according to some literature. The financial crisis may have 
represented a change of regime for some countries that presented worse fundamentals. 
The second regime is caught in the results of this paper. As only the crisis period is being 
analyzed, it is possible to observe that the Southern countries are in a different regime, with investors 
risk aversion being the main driver of sovereign yields in these countries. A change of regimes and 
the importance that investors attach to the country’s specific variables are the main reasons why 
investors’ risk aversion has divergent consequences in different countries. 
Even though this study helps us understand the differences between contagion and risk aversion, 
further investigation is needed to better understand the different impact of investors’ risk aversion 
on different countries’ yields and what triggers the change of investors’ behavior. 
 
6. Robustness test 
In order to check the validity of the results two different robustness tests are performed. 
Firstly, we noticed a parallel between the majority of the results as the coefficients associated 
with the lag of the independent variable are close to one, which may indicate the presence of a unit 
root in this variable. 
In order to test if this affects the results a regression, with the lag of the interest rate differentials 
now as the dependent variable and no lag of the dependent variable incorporated as an explanatory 




The results of this new regression indicate that the majority of the conclusions are not affected 
by the presence of a unit root on the lag of the dependent variable. However there is one country 
where almost all results change sign and significance, which is Austria. This may indicate that the 
presence of a unit root on the lag of the dependent variable affects the results for this country. 
For the events specifications the changes in results are even more subtle. The majority of the 
signs of interest do not change, the impact of the relevant variables stay similar and with the same 
statistical significance. As a result, the conclusions for the events specifications are not affected as 
well. 
Secondly, it was noticed that there was the possibility of existence of endogeneity in the results. 
As SC variables are extracted from the banks’ CDS spreads, these spreads may be correlated to 
sovereign yields, which may cause endogeneity between the SC variable and the yields. 
The difficulty in testing endogeneity consists in the instrument choice as there is a need to 
guarantee that the instrumental variable is connected with the SC variables but that is not affected 
by sovereign yields. We find the best instrument is European Central Bank reference interest rates 
as they are not affected by sovereign yields but may affect the CDS spreads and consequently the 
SC variables. 
To test endogeneity regressions (1) and (2) were estimated with some modifications. First the 
SC variable was used as the dependent variable and the instrument as an independent variable. Then 
the residuals of this new regression were added in regressions (1) and (2), and if the impact of the 
residuals was significantly different from zero we could speak about endogeneity. 
The broad majority of the results indicates that no endogeneity is present. Nevertheless in case 
of Greece, there is endogeneity in the banking contagion coming from Portugal, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany and France. This may indicate that Greek government was more exposed to banking risk 
and that banks had also a high exposure to the Greek situation. 
In case of the Belgian and Italian situation we could also observe some endogeneity, but a week 
one (only considering an interval of confidence of 10%). For Belgium coming from Portugal, Spain 
and Italy and for Italy coming from Austria and Spain. However it is possible to state that the 
endogeneity does not affect the regressions’ results for these two countries. 
As a consequence, we can conclude that only in the Austrian and Greek cases results may not be 




The aim of this paper was to distinguish between the impact of contagion through financial sector 
channels and investors’ risk aversion, both during the entire period of crisis and during sovereign 
bailouts. Results indicate that investors’ risk aversion was the main driver of the differences between 
Central and Southern European countries’ yields, with contagion affecting in a similar way all 
countries in the sample. 
It was possible to conclude as well that the difference in the impact of investors’ risk aversion 
may come about due to the different regimes where some countries find themselves. These different 
regimes may be triggered by a worsening of country’s specifics, which have a small impact on yields. 
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Those conclusions have some policy implications. The Southern Europe countries considered in 
the analysis should focus on achieving long-term financial stability. As investors, started paying 
more attention to the countries’ specifics after the crisis broke out, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy 
were the ones more affected by the change in investors’ behavior. That may have led to a change of 
regime. Moreover, as the paper’s results show, risk premiums is the main driver of sovereign interest 
rates in those countries. So, in order to restore trust of the investors and bring the “regular” regime 
back the periphery countries should therefore focus on financial stability. 
Equally the European Union should react more strongly to financial instability or default of a 
country in order to prevent spreading these phenomena to other countries as the bailouts did. If the 
bailouts contagion to the other Southern Europe countries had not been so strong, those countries 
would have probably been in a better situation during the period studied in this paper. As we have 
seen contagion affects all the European countries in the sample. This is not a desirable situation. 
Accordingly, EU should take measures to prevent contagion.  In order to reach this goal, EU should 
control the financial sector transmission channels, probably by increasing the integration of the 
financial sector in Europe, which at the same time guarantees more effective regulations and a more 
tightened supervision of financial institutions. Countries should also look for new financing ways in 
order to guarantee that neither sovereigns nor the economy are dependent on the financial sector to 
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Annex I – Spillover Coefficient 
To illustrate the CIMDO method we will focus on an example of a portfolio of loans granted to 
two different investors, each one with logarithmic returns given by x and y. The objective function 
is defined as 
𝐶[𝑝, 𝑞] = ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑙𝑛 [
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑞(𝑥, 𝑦)
] 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 
where q(x,y) stands for the prior distribution and p(x,y) the posterior distribution. 
As the CIMDO method assumes that default occurs when the asset value of a firm drops below 
a certain threshold, we may assume that the portfolio follows a multivariate distribution q(x,y)∈ 𝑅2 
that is normal N(0,I), where I is the identity matrix, which is consistent with the economic intuition 
behind the CIMDO method. 
To find the thresholds we will compute an average of the default threshold through time, which 
will be given by 
𝑋𝑑
𝑥 = Φ−1(1 − 𝑃𝑜𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥) and 𝑋𝑑
𝑦
= Φ−1(1 − 𝑃𝑜𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑦) 
where Φ is the inverse of a standard normal cumulative distribution function. 


















1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≥ 𝑋𝑑
𝑖
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 < 𝑋𝑑
𝑖  
, 𝑖 = 𝑥, 𝑦 
However as the objective is to obtain the joint posterior distribution we will calculate 
∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝕀[𝑋𝑑




,∞)𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑦
 
The last constraints that will need to be satisfied are the probability additivity constraints 
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 0 
∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 = 1 
to ensure that p(x,y) is a valid density. 








] 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 
𝑠. 𝑡 ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑥,∞)𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 = 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑥 
    ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑦
,∞)𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑦
 
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 0 
∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 = 1 
Setting up the Lagrangian equation 
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑞) = ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑙𝑛 [
𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑞(𝑥, 𝑦)
] 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 + 𝜆1 [∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑥,∞)𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 − 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑥]
+ 𝜆2 [∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑦
,∞)𝑑𝑦 𝑑𝑥 − 𝑃𝑜𝐷𝑡
𝑦
] + 𝜇 [∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦 − 1] 
which can be simplified to 
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑞) = ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)[ln 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) − ln 𝑞(𝑥, 𝑦)]𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑦
+ ∫∫𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) [𝜆1𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑥,∞) + 𝜆2𝕀[𝑋𝑑
𝑦




we can reach the optimum by performing the following variation 
𝛿𝐿 =





with  being very small and 𝛾(𝑥, 𝑦) a continuous function equal to zero at the boundary of integration 
and finite variance. 
The optimal solution will be then given by 




With the results of 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦)̂  and q(x,y) we can now replace them on the objective function and 
achieve the joint probability of default.  
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Annex II – Index of Global Risk Aversion  
Estimating IGRA: 
𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴 = −(1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑅𝑡) = −(1 −
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑡
𝜋𝑡





Accordingly, we need 𝜋𝑡, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑚𝑡+1) and 𝐸[𝑚𝑡+1]. 









− 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑂𝐼𝑆 (𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝) 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 





where 𝜆𝑚 is the price of risk estimated by CAPM excess returns equation 
𝐸𝑡[𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 ] − 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
= 𝛽𝑖,𝑚𝜆𝑚 
which can be estimated using Fama-MacBeth regressions. 
Another way to estimate the price of risk is by means of the VIX index (Espinoza and Segoviano, 
2010). The price of risk can be inferred from the maximum sharp ratio of an efficient portfolio. 
To prove this we use the pricing equation 
















Historically a Sharpe ratio of 3 or higher would be considered very high, so we normalize the 
VIX index by 4 to scale it down to consistent levels with price of risk properties.  
Third: Estimate 𝜋𝑡 (actual probability of default) using the risk neutral probability of default (𝜋?̂?) 














𝑆𝑁 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑁 
𝐾 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 60%) 
As the market price of risk in a stress situation is not observable, by defining stress as the market 
price of risk above a certain threshold value, and by assuming 𝑚𝑡+1is normally distributed, we can 
infer from the truncated normal distribution formula that 
𝐸𝑡(𝑚𝑡+1|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) =  𝐸𝑡(𝑚𝑡+1|𝑚𝑡+1 > 𝑇) = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡𝜆(α𝑡) 
where  
𝜇𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑚𝑡+1] 





Φ− normal comulative distribution function 





with the threshold being given by 
𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑚] + Φ−1[1 − 𝜋𝑡]√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑚) =
1
1 + ?̅?
+ Φ−1[1 − 𝜋𝑡]𝜎 
respectively, the actual probability of default will be given by estimating the non-linear equation 
𝜋𝑡 =
𝜋?̂?




















Annex III – Results 
Table 1 – Risk aversion vs banking contagion4 
 
  
                                                          
4 *** - Statistically significant at 1%; ** - Statistically significant at 5%; * - Statistically significant at 10% 
 
                                                          
1 *** - Statistically significant at 1%; ** - Statistically significant at 5%; * - Statistically significant at 10% 
 Portugal Greece Italy Spain France Austria Belgium Germany 
Mean Equation1         
Lag Dependent Var 1.011*** 0.983*** 0.982*** 0.984*** 0.988*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.992*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
IRAGER 0.113*** 0.304*** 0.050** 0.032 0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.023) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Debt/GDP -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.002* -0.003*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deficit/GDP -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.009** 0.004** -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Portugal SC - -0.079*** 0.012 0.04 -0.005 -0.011 0.005 -0.000 
 - (0.024) (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.001) 
Greece SC 0.001 - 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.016** 0.001 
 (0.008) - (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) 
Italy SC 0.486** 2.246*** - 0.092* -0.285 -0.117 -0.088 -0.001 
 (0.191) (0.040) - (0.047) (0.247) (0.170) (0.179) (0.002) 
Spain SC -0.897*** -2.962*** -0.604*** - 0.928* -0.110 0.050 0.000 
 (0.063) (0.028) (0.100) - (0.502) (0.214) (0.425) (0.007) 
France SC 1.042*** 0.684*** 0.834*** 1.224*** - 0.034 0.710** 0.149 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.331) (0.418) - (0.169) (0.319) (0..137) 
Austria SC -0.26*** 0.047 -0.184 -0.484* -0.264 - -0.428 -0.003** 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.255) (0.290) (0.219) - (0.264) (0.002) 
Belgium SC 0.365*** 0.328** -0.03 0.306*** -0.130 0.118 - -0.003* 
 (0.066) (0.137) (0.178) (0.031) (0.351) (0.345) - (0.002) 
Germany SC -0.713*** -0.27* 0.003** -0.97*** -0.001 0.003** -0.002 - 
 (0.012) (0.164) (0.001) (0.250) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Variance Equation         
Constant 0.000 0.00 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arch term 0.192*** 0.236*** 0.218*** 0.319*** 0.054*** 0.070*** 0.133*** 0.051*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.036) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) 
Garch term 0.850*** 0.906*** 0.850*** 0.716*** 0.924*** 0.907*** 0.862*** 0.929*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.015) 
Tarch term 0.034 -0.240*** -0.145*** -0.047 0.024 0.011 -0.052** 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.025) (0.039) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) 
R square 0.996 0.994 0.987 0.988 0.991 0.995 0.990 0.995 
Number of observations 1126 1126 1125 1126 1125 1125 1125 1126 
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SC*Before 0.02** -0.003 0.03*** -0.004 0.02 
SC*Event 0.02 -0.01 0.02* 0.02 -0.01 
IRA 0.32*** -0.27 -0.60*** -1.58*** 0.36 
Belgium 
SC*Before 0.02* 0.01 -0.001 -0.004 0.01 
SC*Event 0.02 -0.01 0.02* -0.002 0.03 
IRA 0.22 1.28 0.99*** -0.65 0.67** 
France 
SC*Before 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.02 
SC*Event 0.01 0.002 0.03* 0.01* 0.01 
IRA -0.32 -0.06 0.11 -1.83*** 0.65*** 
Germany 
SC*Before 0.002 0.02** 0.02 0.001 0.01 
SC*Event 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04** 
IRA -1.09*** -0.72** -0.95*** -1.60*** -0.49* 
Greece 
SC*Before - - - -0.10 -0.04 
SC*Event - - - -0.19*** -0.35 
IRA - - - 1.17 9.68*** 
Italy 
SC*Before 0.02 0.04** 0.01 0.01 -0.05 
SC*Event 0.02*** 0.03* 0.003 -0.01 0.09** 
IRA 0.59*** 3.57*** 2.12*** -0.56 0.76 
Portugal 
SC*Before 0.12*** 0.03 0.23* - 0.06 
SC*Event 0.12*** 0.03 0.07 - 0.11 
IRA 3.32*** 0.86 3.46*** - 1.13 
Spain 
SC*Before 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.02 - 
SC*Event 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.01 -0.03* - 
 IRA 1.08*** 4.65*** 0.17 1.25* - 
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